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QUESTI[ONIING HOW THE BANKRUPTCY
PRIORITY SCHEME TREATS TAX CLAIMS




The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA")1 prescribes the metes and bounds of pension plan funding
and termination.2 Funding rules assure employees that they will
receive income from pension plans when they retire. Nonetheless, a
plan sponsor may terminate a plan in a number of situations, including
a bankruptcy filing. Upon termination, a pension plan may be
overfunded or underfunded.3 The Internal Revenue Code ("IRC")
provides two kinds of assessments" that a plan sponsor may be
obligated to pay when it terminates a pension plan. The nature of the
exaction depends on whether the plan that the sponsor terminated
was overfunded or underfunded.6 Specifically, IRC § 4980 assesses an
obligation on overfunded plans, while § 4971 levels an exaction on
underfunded plans.7 Moreover, if a pension plan sponsor terminates a
plan and files a bankruptcy petition, the priority rules of the
Bankruptcy Code channel each of these obligations as they mature
* This Note would not have been published without the insightful advice and
instruction of Professor Susan Block-Lieb. In addition, I dedicate this Note to Dean
John D. Feerick, who has been, and will continue to be, an inspiration to a generation
of Fordham law students and alumni. Lastly, I thank my family and friends for all
their support.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1994).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 59-85.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 62-68, 87-102.
4. Tax Reform Act of 1986,26 U.S.C. §§ 1-end (1994).
5. This Note uses the words "assessment," "exaction," or "obligation"
interchangeably to denote various compulsory payments imposed by the IRC and
state tax codes. The use of the words "tax," "excise tax," or "penalty," each of which
is subject to distinct treatment by the bankruptcy claim payment scheme, are reserved
for passages in which this Note discusses and analyzes the case law debate regarding
the significance of those words in the bankruptcy context. For more on the excise tax-
penalty debate, see infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part I.C-D.
7. See infra Part I.D.
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into different types of bankruptcy claims, each of which entitles the
government to varying degrees of repayment.8  The differing
treatment of these tax claims by the bankruptcy priority scheme is the
result of a test fashioned by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.9  However, the
Fabricators test does not acknowledge the competing policies of the
three federal regulatory regimes-namely, ERISA, the IRC, and the
Bankruptcy Code'°-that collide when the bankruptcy priority
scheme orders overfunding and underfunding tax claims.
This Note argues that the current state of the law does not
sufficiently consider the competing pension, tax, and bankruptcy
policies and proposes that Congress amend IRC § 4980 to advance
bankruptcy policies that maximize distribution to creditors and
protect innocent creditors from bearing the cost of a debtor's
misdeeds. Part I provides a brief overview of the ERISA statute,
focusing specifically on the provisions governing pension plan funding
and termination; it describes why and how a plan can become
overfunded or underfunded, and explains IRC §§ 4980 and 4971. Part
II focuses on the bankruptcy context, describing the priority scheme
that orders claim payment in bankruptcy and delving into the case law
debate over whether a particular obligation is a claim for a penalty or
a tax entitled to special treatment in the priority scheme. Part II
concludes by examining how the current state of the law treats the
competing tax, pension, and bankruptcy policies. Part III argues that
courts, in their treatment of § 4980, have overlooked the bankruptcy
policies of maximized distribution and innocent creditor protection.
Part III concludes by presenting judicial and legislative solutions that
promote the relevant bankruptcy policies, and by advocating the
narrowest option: amending IRC § 4980 to exempt bankrupt plan
sponsors from liability." This amendment would expand the
bankruptcy estate, enabling a greater distribution to general
unsecured creditors.
8. See infra Part I.C.
9. 518 U.S. 213 (1996).
10. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, amended
by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 353, amended by Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family
Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3089, amended by
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 and other scattered sections of the U.S.C. (1994)) ("Bankruptcy
Code").
11. An entity filing under Chapter 7 is exempt only from the higher of the two
exaction rates assessable under § 4980. See infra text accompanying notes 107-123.
This Note proposes to expand the exemption to preclude application of both rates to
all debtors.
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I. OVERVIEW OF THE LAW OF PENSION PLAN FUNDING AND
TERMINATION
This part will illustrate the operation of certain ERISA and IRC
sections that regulate pension plan overfunding and underfunding. It
is important to note, however, that pension plans existed for several
decades before Congress enacted ERISA in 1974. The pre-ERISA
era demonstrates how the adverse effects of corporate policy on
generations of workers brought about the evolution of retirement
income security regulation-an often misunderstood and obscure
niche in commercial law practice. Thus, the first section will describe
the pre-ERISA legal regime and its effects, summarizing the ills
Congress sought to cure when it drafted the act. The second section
will explain ERISA's pension plan funding and termination
requirements. The third section will discuss the mechanics of pension
plans, demonstrating how they become overfunded or underfunded.
The last section will highlight the relevant IRC sections that assess
exactions payable by a plan sponsor which overfunds or underfunds
its pension plan.
A. The ERISA Backstory
Pension plans existed in the nineteenth century but to a very limited
extent.12 In 1875, the American Express Company, then in the
railroad transportation business, established the nation's first formal
pension plan, providing benefits to its disabled workers over sixty
years old who served the firm for at least twenty years.'3 Through the
first third of the twentieth century only the largest corporations
established pension plans for their employees; by 1925 these
companies had established 400 plans. 4 The number of pension plans
in the United States increased during the twentieth century primarily
because of the growth of the domestic economy. Indeed, the
evolution of the pension plan rides on the coattails of the evolution of
modem capital markets. 5  As companies grew in the postwar
economy, pension and welfare benefits substituted for wages that
were stabilized because of government-mandated wage freezes during
World War II and the Korean War. 6 The number of employees
covered by pension plans increased five-fold between 1940 and 1960.1'
Since 1940, the number and aggregate asset base of pension plans
steadily increased from 4,000,000 covered employees and $2.4 billion
12. William C. Greenough & Francis P. King, Pension Plans and Public Policy 27-
29 (1976).
13. Id. at 27-28.
14. S. Rep. No. 93-127 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4839; Paul P.
Harbrecht, Pension Funds and Economic Power 9 (1959).
15. See Harbrecht, supra note 14, at 6.




in plan assets18 to almost 70,000,00019 and $4.8 trillion, respectively, in
2000.20 Companies established pension plans for reasons that are still
salient today-namely, to secure a steady employee base for the long
term and to take income tax deductions in the amount of the funds
contributed to the plan.21
Before Congress passed ERISA, the regulatory requirements that
accompanied corporate pension plan funding were limited to a
number of tax provisions and superficial disclosure rules. For
example, before Congress's revision of the tax code in 1938, a
company could "reclaim not merely plan assets in excess of the value
of liabilities, but the entire corpus of the trust."'22 Congress later
adopted several legislative measures that nonetheless proved
inadequate. The relevant pre-ERISA federal statutes governing
pensions were the Welfare Pension Plans Disclosure Act
("WPPDA"), the Labor-Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), and
the 1954 version of the IRC. The WPPDA was adopted to "protect
the interest of welfare and pension plan participants and beneficiaries
through disclosure of information with respect to such plans."'  The
statute required plan administrators to file with the Secretary of
Labor and send to plan participants upon written request a plan
description and annual report.24 The LMRA addressed pension issues
not covered by the WPPDA, providing guidelines on the
establishment and operation of plans administered jointly by unions
and employers.' The 1954 IRC continued the policy of allowing
"various tax advantages to accrue to employers who establish[ed] and
maintain[ed] pension plans which... qualif[ied] for such tax benefit
privileges. 26
Several problems arose under the former, pre-ERISA legal regime.
Congressional leaders found that the WPPDA was "weak in its
limited disclosure requirements and wholly lacking in substantive
fiduciary standards. '27 Specifically, they pointed out that "[i]ts chief
procedural weakness can be found in its reliance upon the initiative of
18. Id. at 4839-40.
19. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration,
Abstract of 1996 Form 5500 Annual Reports No. 9 (Winter 1999-2000), available at
http://www.dol.gov/dol/pwba/public/programs/opr/builetl996/hilites.htm.
20. Employee Benefits Research Institute, EBRI Pension Investment Report,
Dec. 2000 Highlights, at http://www.ebri.org/facts/0101fact.htm (last visited March 10,
2002).
21. See E. Thomas Veal & Edward R. Mackiewicz, Pension Plan Terminations 9
(2d ed. 1998).
22. Id. at 162.
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the individual employee to police the management of his plan."' The
report deemed the scope of the LMRA too narrow, and the
congressional leaders stated that the 1954 IRC "provide[d] only
limited safeguards for the security of anticipated benefit rights in
private plans. 2 9 Among the specific problems that the report cited
were reliance by plan participants on the equitable remedies of the
common law of trusts to vindicate their rights," inadequate coverage,
misuse of pension funds, capricious losses of benefits as a result of
draconian funding and vesting provisions in plan indentures, and the
unintended consequences of business failure." Congress drafted
ERISA as a response to these statutory limitations and empirical
problems.
The simple purpose of ERISA is to protect individual pension
rights?2  ERISA sets forth minimum vesting,3  funding, and
fiduciary35 standards and a system of compulsory benefit insurance's in
order to achieve that purpose. Congress hoped ERISA would
[(1)] assure American workers that they may look forward, with
anticipation, to a retirement with financial security and dignity ....
[(2)] increase stability within the framework of our nation's
economy ... [(3)] restore credibility and faith in the private pension
plans.... [and (4)] encourage rather than diminish efforts by
management and industry to expand pension plan coverage and to
improve benefits for workers."7
The next section will explain the operation of specific ERISA




30. Relying on the common law of trusts is far from ideal for workers. It would be
onerous for workers to meet the requirements of the law of trusts before making out a
claim because they would be forced to depend on a substantive body of law not
designed to meet the specific problems that pension disputes present. Additionally,
their claims would then be subject to conflicting applications by state courts.
31. H.R. Rep. No. 93-807 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4672; H.R.
Rep. No. 93-533 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4642; Howell E.
Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107 Harv. L
Rev. 509,542-43 (1994).
32. H.R. Rep. No. 93-533 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4643. For
a discussion of tax and bankruptcy policy interests, see infra Part III.A.
33. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061
(1994).
34. Id. §§ 1081-1086.
35. Id. §§ 1101-1114.
36. Id. §§ 1301-1461.
37. H.R. Rep. No. 93-533 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,4646-47.
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B. Pension Plan Funding and Termination Under ERISA
This section distinguishes the defined benefit plan from other
ERISA-qualified plans, explains the funding rules that apply to the
defined benefit plan, and discusses the rules governing the
termination of overfunded and underfunded plans. Because ERISA
protects a broad array of plans and in order to avoid confusion, it is
necessary to explore the mechanics distinguishing each type of plan in
order to understand why ERISA's funding and termination rules are
selectively applicable to defined benefit plans. A summary of
ERISA's funding and termination rules provides the foundation for
understanding the treatment of pension issues in the business failure
context.
ERISA generally applies to qualified plans. In order for a plan to
be qualified-that is, subject to the requirements and protections of
ERISA-it must be a writing38 that is communicated to employees
eligible for coverage39 and it must operate for the exclusive benefit of
those employees or their beneficiaries. 0 It also must prohibit the
assignment or alienation of benefits41 and satisfy minimal standards on
vesting and accrual of benefits.42
ERISA distinguishes between the defined benefit plan and the
defined contribution plan. Thus, before explaining ERISA's specific
provisions, a brief summary of the taxonomy of pension plans is in
order. While both the defined benefit and the defined contribution
plan may meet the definition of an ERISA-qualified plan, their
respective mechanics differ.
The term "defined contribution plan" encompasses stock bonus
plans, profit sharing plans, money purchase plans, and 401(k) plans.43
Despite their mechanical diversity, these plans share some basic
characteristics. In a defined contribution plan, an employer allots an
individual account to each participating employee ' and contributes a
specified amount to the account, investing the funds on the
employee's behalf4  Importantly, the employee bears the investment
risk; he or she keeps whatever is left in the account upon retirement,
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) ("Every employee benefit plan shall be established and
maintained pursuant to a written instrument.").
39. See Gary I. Boren & Norman P. Stein, Qualified Deferred Compensation
Plans § 2.11, at 31-32 (2001). Generally, employers provide covered employees with a
summary plan description to satisfy the communication requirement. See 29 U.S.C. §
1022.
40. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1994); Boren & Stein, supra note 39, § 2.12, at 32-33.
41. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d).
42. Boren & Stein, supra note 39, § 2.16, at 51.
43. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97
Colum. L. Rev. 1519, 1546-47 (1997).
44. Boren & Stein, supra note 39, § 1.06, at 12-13.
45. Gordon, supra note 43, at 1546.
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for better or worse.' Employers are not subject to ERISA's funding
and insurance requirements47 because there is no underfunding risk to
insure.' An employer's funding obligation ends when it contributes
periodically to the plan.49 Thus, fund assets need not reach a defined
value upon distribution.-"
The IRC prosaically describes a "defined benefit plan" as "any plan
which is not a defined contribution plan,"'" but, nevertheless, the
central distinguishing feature of the defined benefit plan may be
identified as the benefit formula. While the defined benefit plan
establishes neither the exact amount that an employee receives upon
retirement nor the amount an employer will contribute annually, it
does set forth the formula that determines the amount of an
employee's ultimate retirement benefit.5 The variables in the benefit
formula are usually the number of years worked and the average
monthly wage earned during an employee's final years of service. 3
The benefit is distributed as a monthly or yearly payment that
commences upon retirement and continues until the employee's
death.' Unlike under a defined contribution plan, an employer that
creates a defined benefit plan bears the investment risk and must
eventually be able to meet its promise to pay out a specific known
amount to a retiring employee.5 Additionally, the employer must
comply with ERISA's weighty regulatory requirements that spell out
strict rules for plan funding, benefit vesting, fiduciary duties, plan
termination, and pension insurance.
Just as pension plans generally fall into either the defined benefit or
defined contribution category, they also must be either multi-
employer or single-employer plans. These types are distinguished
principally by how they are created and who governs them. The labor
union is the nucleus of a multi-employer plan. Often a union will
negotiate for the establishment of a pension plan for its members. In
such a case, the employer's obligation to create and fund the plan will
be written into a collective bargaining agreement. -' Large unions may
create their own pension funds, to which employers will be required
46. Id.
47. Daniel Keating, Chapter 11's New Ten-Ton Monster: The PBGC and




51. 26 U.S.C. § 4140) (1994).
52. Boren & Stein, supra note 39, § 1.07, at 13-20.
53. Norman P. Stein, Reversions From Pension Plans: History, Policies, and
Prospects, 44 Tax L. Rev. 259,265 (1989) [hereinafter Stein, Reversions].
54. Boren & Stein, supra note 39, § 1.07, at 13-20.
55. See Keating, Monster, supra note 47, at 806.




by the collective bargaining agreement to contribute.57 Section
302(c)(5) of the Taft-Hartley Act requires the union and employers to
jointly administer a plan.5 1 In contrast, a single-employer plan is
simply created by an employer for the sole benefit of its own
employees. The employer is then responsible for funding and
administering the plan. This Note focuses on defined benefit plans,
without regard to whether they are multi-employer or single-employer
plans.
Currently, the aggregate asset base for the 38,000 American defined
benefit plans that cover 43 million participants59 is $2.2 trillion.6'
ERISA provides several rules that aim to protect the employee
retirement income generated by these plans. Rules pertaining to plan
funding and termination relate directly to the central question raised
in this Note.
ERISA and the IRC are the primary statutory sources for plan
funding. The basic notion that the funding rules advance is that a
pension plan sponsor must maintain a minimum level of funding in
order to take advantage of the concomitant tax benefits. IRC § 401(f)
permits employers to fund pensions through trusts, insurance
contracts, or other instruments. 61 A basic system of funding principles
applies to all of these funding vehicles.62 Pension funding requires
employers to pay now for future benefits whose exact value is
uncertain. Accordingly, funding principles rely on actuarial
assumptions that attempt to predict the eventual cost of pension
benefits.63
ERISA requires employers to conduct funding activity through
what it calls a "funding standard account."' The funding standard
account operates on the basis of a sponsor's actuarial assumptions and
is charged annually for currently-accruing liabilities, amortized
liabilities for work performed before the plan's inception, and losses
to the plan's asset base. On the other side of the ledger, the account
57. Id.
58. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1994); Soble et al., supra note 56, at 158.
59. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 2000 Annual Report 12 (including active and
retired participants).
60. Employee Benefits Research Institute, EBRI Pension Investment Report,
Dec. 2000 highlights, at http://www.ebri.org/facts/0101fact.htm (last visited March 10,
2002).
61. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(0 (1994); Stein, Reversions, supra note 53, at 264.
62. See Stein, Reversions, supra note 53, at 264.
63. Id. The factors that plan sponsors consider in reaching their actuarial
assumptions include the plan's predicted rate of return on investment, the plan's
administrative expenses, employee turnover, employee mortality, terminal annuity
costs, and salary scale. Id. at 268-69. Once an employer establishes its actuarial
assumptions, it must make them known to the Treasury Department and cannot
revise them without the Secretary of the Treasury's consent. 29 U.S.C. §
1082(c)(5)(A).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b); see Stein, Reversions, supra note 53, at 272.
65. Stein, Reversions, supra note 53, at 272.
2444 [Vol. 70
IRC § 4980 IN BANKRUPTCY
is credited with a sponsor's annual contribution and gains to the asset
base.66 Therefore, after making actuarial assumptions about the
growth of plan assets and the cost of providing benefits, plan sponsors
create a long-term schedule that sets forth the amount of each of its
annual contributions to the pension trust.67 In theory, an employer's
goal is to reach plan maturity in a timely fashion by fulfilling its
funding obligations.
Despite a sponsor's best efforts, a plan may arrive at an
underfunded or overfunded state. Primarily, this occurs because a
plan's actuarial assumptions are incorrect, but there is no adverse
penalty if an actuarial model has an off year so long as a plan meets its
minimum funding standard. Plan sponsors expect that the good years
will balance out the bad and that the plan will have no problem
distributing benefits in the end.'
Nonetheless, there are provisions built into ERISA should a plan
sponsor need a temporary respite from the rigors of complying with
funding rules, or if it simply wants to discontinue the plan. First,
ERISA § 303(a) offers a waiver from its minimum funding rules to
employers that fail to meet their minimum funding obligations
because of "temporary substantial business hardship."'6 The second
option for an employer struggling with ERISA's funding rules, and
the more central one to the issue raised by this Note, is plan
termination.
ERISA prescribes two methods for termination-standard and
distress. Standard termination is available to companies that can pay
their pension liabilities and whose plans are thus not underfunded;"
they terminate for other reasons.71 ERISA allows employers to satisfy
their liabilities by purchasing irrevocable insurance annuities that pay
plan benefits. 2 These annuities usually defer payment of benefits
until the employee reaches retirement age under the plan.
66. Id
67. See id at 265-66.
68. Id at 270.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(a); Keating, Monster, supra note 47, at 810. The non-
inclusive statutory factors for analyzing whether a company is experiencing a
"temporary substantial business hardship" are (1) whether the company is operating
at an economic loss; (2) whether there is a company- and industry-wide trend of
substantial unemployment or underemployment; (3) whether the company's industry
is undergoing a period of declining or depressed sales and profits; and (4) whether it is
reasonable to expect that the plan will survive only if the employer receives the
waiver. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(b). While the waiver frees an employer from meeting its
annual funding obligations, id. § 1083(a), the deficiency must be amortized over a
period of no more than five years. Id. § 1082(b)(C). An employer can obtain a
maximum of three waivers every fifteen years. Id. § 1083(a).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b).
71. See infra at Part I.C. for elaboration on why employers terminate well-funded
plans.
72. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(3)(A)(i); Norman P. Stein, Taxing Reversion From
Pension Plans, 35 Tax Notes 1131, 1132 (1987) [hereinafter Stein, Taxing].
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Sometimes, however, plans provide for a lump sum cash payment
equal to the present value of an employee's vested benefits.73 A plan
sponsor can recover the residual plan assets remaining after it satisfies
its plan liabilities.74
The second kind of plan termination is a distress termination. The
key player in distress terminations is the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation ("PBGC"), a non-profit federal corporation modeled
along the lines of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.75
ERISA established the PBGC to insure failing pension funds by
paying vested benefits to participants whose employers have
terminated their underfunded plans.76 The PBGC receives no money
from the federal government; instead, it is funded entirely from
premiums paid by pension plan sponsors and income generated from
the assets of terminated plans under its control.77
In the case of a distress termination, the employer is generally
sponsoring an underfunded plan,78 thus triggering the PBGC's role as
insurer. This role requires PBGC to step into the employer's shoes
and pay the vested benefits of plan participants. 79 The employer must
meet one of the following four tests in order to effect a voluntary
distress termination:' (1) the employer is in a liquidation
proceeding;8 (2) the employer is in a reorganization proceeding in
which the bankruptcy court has approved the termination and has
determined that the employer "will be unable to pay its debts.., and
will be unable to continue in business outside the Chapter 11
reorganization process"; 82 (3) absent termination, the employer will be
unable to pay all its debts as they come due and will be unable to
continue in business;83 or (4) the cost of maintaining a pension plan
has become unreasonably burdensome solely because of a declining
workforce. 84 Additionally, the PBGC can effect an involuntary
73. See 29 C.F.R. § 4044.73(a)(1) (2001); Stein, Taxing, supra note 72, at 1132.
74. See 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(1); Stein, Taxing, supra note 72, at 1132. IRC §
401(a)(2) permits an "employer to recover at termination of the [plan] trust and only
at termination of the trust, any balance which is due to erroneous actuarial
computation." Stein, Reversions, supra note 53, at 261. However, in practice, the IRS
generally does not enforce this provision to the letter because it considers every
surplus to be the result of erroneous actuarial computation. See id.
75. See Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991
Wis. L. Rev. 65, 69 [hereinafter Keating, Hazard].
76. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a); see Keating, Monster, supra note 47, at 807.
77. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 2000 Annual Report 26 (2001); Keating,
Monster, supra note 47, at 807.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 94-102 (discussing underfunded plans).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 1305(b)(2)(E); Weil, Gotshal & Manges, L.L.P., Reorganizing
Failing Businesses 24-15 (2000).
80. See Keating, Monster, supra note 47, at 808.
81. See 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(i)(I).
82. Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(ii)(IV).
83. Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(iii)(I).
84. Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(iii)(II).
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termination if (1) a plan has failed to meet its minimum funding
obligations or will be unable to pay benefits when due, (2) the PBGC
-will likely suffer an unreasonable long-term loss, or (3) upon the
occurrence of a statutorily-prescribed event. '
With a basic grasp of the legal principles of plan funding and
termination, the next section points out how plans become
underfunded or overfunded in practice and why sponsors terminate
them.
C. The Mechanics and Effect of Pension Plan Overfiinding and
Underfinding
Every year many plan sponsors terminate their pension plans.
There may be several reasons that lead a sponsor to terminate. Some
plans may be overfunded, which triggers a reversion of the residual
assets to the plan sponsor. Other plans may be underfunded, thereby
requiring the PBGC to administer the plan and pay guaranteed
benefits to the plan's participants. This section explores the various
business circumstances that lead a company to terminate its
overfunded or underfunded plan.
In 2000, the PBGC reported the successful standard termination of
1,880 plans.' The sponsors of those plans chose the standard
termination method because their plans had sufficient funds to pay
their benefit obligations. A sponsor is entitled to keep the plan assets
that remain after paying its benefit liabilities; however, the IRC
assesses a special exaction on these assets, reducing a terminating plan
sponsor's net asset recovery."
A plan sponsor may overfund its plan because the plan's erroneous
actuarial assumptions projected a need for contributions greater than
the actual accrued benefits.' For example, if a company's workforce
is young and expanding, contributions to the plan will rise faster than
benefits distributed by the plan, causing an overfunded state.' In
contrast, a plan will be underfunded if fund assets underperform the
predicted rate of return on investment or employees quit at a greater
85. Id § 1342(a); Keating, Hazard, supra note 75, at 70. The reportable event that
permits the PBGC to file an involuntary termination is as follows:
[W]hen there is a distribution under the plan to a participant who is a
substantial owner... if-(A) such distribution has a value of S10,000 or
more; (B) such distribution is not made by reason of the death of the
participant; and (C) immediately after the distribution, the plan has
nonforfeitable benefits which are not funded ....
29 U.S.C. § 1343(c)(7).
86. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 2000 Annual Report 9 (2001).
87. See infra Part I.D. for more on the taxation of plan asset reversions.
88. See Veal & Mackiewicz, supra note 21, at 157; Daniel Fischel & John H.
Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1105, 1149 (1988).
89. See Veal & Mackiewicz, supra note 21, at 156-57.
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rate than predicted 0  Often, a plan continues to operate and
overfunded years are later balanced out by underfunded years, and
vice versa.9 In the previous example, the young employees will age
and many may retire at once and receive retirement benefits, tipping
the scales in the opposite direction and causing a plan to be
underfunded. However, a company may choose to terminate its plan
before the end of its intended life cycle for many reasons, the most
germane of which, for the purposes of this Note, is financial hardship.
A company in bankruptcy liquidation or reorganization proceedings
may terminate its plan in order to use excess funds to satisfy the
claims of creditors. 2 In order to stave off the need for bankruptcy
protection, a company may free up residual assets from its pension
plan and use them to prevent business failure.93
Reaching an underfunded state is usually less often the result of
employer strategy than reaching an overfunded state. Most of the
time, plans are underfunded simply because their sponsors cannot
90. See Stein, Reversions, supra note 53, at 270.
91. See id.
92. See Weil, Gotshal & Manges, L.L.P., supra note 79, at 24-14 (citing In re
Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., No. 95-1354 (Bankr. D. Del. May 20, 1997) (approving
pension plan termination)).
93. See Veal & Mackiewicz, supra note 21, at 9. Other reasons for terminating a
plan may have nothing to do with financial hardship. It is important to realize,
however, that it is possible for a sponsor to terminate its overfunded plan for a non-
bankruptcy reason and later find cause to file Chapter 11, in which case the § 4980
claims would become claims in the bankruptcy proceeding. For instance, a company
may terminate because it is participating in a merger. In that case, the combined
entity, in its effort to integrate operations, would want a uniform benefits policy,
eliminating one or both plans. See id. Another reason for termination is a change in
the employer's labor policies. See id. A company may decide that its defined benefit
plan is no longer meeting its objectives, move to terminate the plan, and then
establish another type of plan, perhaps a defined contribution plan. See id. A more
democratic basis for termination is a change in employee preference. See id.
Especially when the equity markets are performing well, employees learn of the
benefit of investment control that an individual retirement account offers through
publicity or the rising spikes in the net worth of peers participating in stock bonus
plans. As a result, employees may want their retirement returns to perform as well as
the market and demand a different employee benefit vehicle that enables them to do
so. See id. Another reason may be of import to lawmakers: that is, termination as a
result of a company's inability to cope with legal and regulatory changes. See id. at 10.
Constant changes in the tax and ERISA systems resulting from statutory revisions,
agency rulings, new regulations, and judicial decisions increase the legal compliance
burden. See id. Employers, especially smaller ones, frustrated by the complexity of
the law, may opt out of their defined benefit plans and create simpler alternatives. See
id. The statistics offer at least correlative proof: the number of defined benefit plans
decreased from 114,000 in 1985 to 38,000 in 2000, while participants in defined benefit
plans who are currently working declined sixteen percent between 1988 and 1998.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 2000 Annual Report 12 (2001). Additionally, tax-
exempt companies have a special incentive to terminate. They can terminate their
plans and recoup residual assets without the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
assessing harsh taxes on those assets. See Veal & Mackiewicz, supra note 21, at 10.
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meet their minimum funding obligations.' Among the most dramatic
recent examples include Eastern Air Lines and Pan American World
Airways, each of which terminated pension plans with over $500
million in unfunded liabilities.95 Furthermore, there is a bankruptcy
incentive to terminate an underfunded plan while under the
protection of the Bankruptcy Code. First, in bankruptcy an
employer's obligation to contribute to a plan will cease." Second, the
employer can satisfy the PBGC's claim' for a fraction of its statutory
liability, assuming that general unsecured creditors are paid below one
hundred cents on the dollar.9
Just as a default on debt generally raises doubts about a company's
ability to continue as a going concern, underfunded pension plans
signal a state of financial distress. However, there are two strategic
reasons for a plan sponsor to voluntarily underfund. First, one
commentator has posited that plan sponsors have engaged in tax
avoidance behavior in connection with the exaction assessed on
residual assets reverting to an employer following termination of an
overfunded plan.' He suggests that increases in the exaction rate
have created an incentive for many plan sponsors voluntarily to limit
their ongoing plan funding to a minimal but legal level that, upon
termination, would result in a shortfall of assets because previously
amortized past service liabilities would become due.t" A second
incentive is the moral hazard that employers face as a result of the
existence of PBGC insurance; they have less incentive to fund their
plans properly because they know the PBGC will bail them out.0'1
94. See Weil, Gotshal & Manges, L.L.P., supra note 79, at 24-15.
95. See id. at 24-14; Edwin McDowell, U.S. Moves On Pan Am Pensions, N.Y.
Times, July 25, 1991, at D1; Agis Salpukas, Eastern Pact With Agency Assures Pension
Payments, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1990, at Dl. There is no doubt that the recent Enron
bankruptcy has brought retirement income security into sharper focus. See Richard
W. Stevenson & Stephen Labaton, Bush to Propose More Flexibility on 401(k) Plans,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 2002, at Al. However, most Enron employees were not enrolled
in defined benefit plans; rather, they had 401(k) accounts heavily invested in company
stock. See Jo Thomas, Labor Dept. Reviews Ban On Stock Sale, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24,
2002, at C6. Ordinarily, 401(k) account holders have more control over their
portfolios and can adjust the investment risk according to their preference. However,
Enron's plans were in a "lockdown" or "blackout" period during which employees
could not control their accounts. See id. Consequently, these accounts lost most of
their value as the price of Enron's stock plunged. See id. Indeed, some Enron
employees were saved by the comparatively conservative defined benefit accounts
they retained after their former employers were acquired by Enron. See Saul
Friedman, Enron Fiasco Shows 401(k)s' Dangers, Newsday (New York), Jan. 29,
2002, at B10.
96. See Weil, Gotshal & Manges, L.L.P., supra note 79, at 24-19.
97. PBGC claims usually are general unsecured claims. See id.
98. See id
99. See Richard A. Ippolito, Reversion Taxes, Contingent Benefits, and the Decline
in Pension Funding, 44 J.L. & Econ. 199,203-04 (2001).
100. See id.; Keating, Monster, supra note 47, at 811-12.
101. See Keating, Hazard, supra note 75, at 71-76.
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This particular consequence is an utter failure of taxation and pension
policies, a failure that vitiates ERISA's purpose of ensuring payment
of benefits."° Easing the tax rules concerning overfunded plans would
lessen these two incentives and undercut the desirability of voluntary
underfunding. The next section will elaborate on the tax rules that
govern plan terminations, thereby facilitating a better understanding
of how tax, pension, and bankruptcy policies collide.
D. Tax Rules Governing Pension Plan Termination
Pension plan termination naturally gives rise to certain tax
consequences. Thus, the IRC provides rules in the event that a plan
sponsor terminates an oveffunded or underfunded pension plan.
Termination of overfunded pensions yields residual assets. These
assets must first satisfy an employer's pension liabilities. 3 The
remainder reverts to the employer and is taxable as ordinary
income.1°4 Reverted assets are treated as ordinary income primarily
because they recapture tax benefits that resulted from previously
deducted contributions and from the tax-free growth of those
contributions over the life of the plan.105 Thus, the government taxes
these assets to recover these benefits upon termination. 06
Specifically, IRC § 49801°7 provides an exaction of twenty percent on
102. See Ippolito, supra note 99, at 223. Congress has not yet addressed this
unintended consequence. See infra at Part III.B for my conclusion that Congress
should study this policy problem.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
104. Veal & Mackiewicz, supra note 21, at 216.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. Section 4980 provides, in pertinent part, the following:
(a) IMPOSITION OF TAX. There is hereby imposed a tax of 20 percent of
the amount of any employer reversion from a qualified plan.
(b) LIABILITY FOR TAX. The tax imposed by subsection (a) shall be paid
by the employer maintaining the plan.
(d) INCREASE IN TAX FOR FAILURE TO ESTABLISH
REPLACEMENT PLAN OR INCREASE BENEFITS.
(1) IN GENERAL. Subsection (a) shall be applied by substituting "50
percent" for "20 percent" with respect to any employer reversion from a
qualified plan unless-
(A) the employer establishes or maintains a qualified replacement
plan, or
(B) the plan provides benefit increases meeting the requirements of
paragraph (3).
(2) QUALIFIED REPLACEMENT PLAN. For purposes of this
subsection, the term "qualified replacement plan" means a qualified plan
established or maintained by the employer in connection with a qualified
plan termination (hereinafter referred to as the "replacement plan") with
respect to which the following requirements are met:
(A) Participation requirement. At least 95 percent of the active
participants in the terminated plan who remain as employees of the
employer after the termination are active participants in the replacement
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the total value of residual assets." * This tax rises to fifty percent if
funds are not eventually diverted to a replacement plan.' The
combined ordinary income taxation and § 4980 taxation can whittle
away up to eighty-three percent of a reversion."" However, § 4980(d)
limits the tax rate to twenty percent if the plan sponsor has
commenced a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code."' Firms reorganizing under Chapter 11, however,
are taxed under the normal bifurcated 20/50 scheme.
Congress enacted § 4980 in response to a trend that peaked in the
early to mid-1980s in which an alarming number of sponsors
strategically terminated overfunded plans in order to extract the
residual assets left over after pension liabilities were paid."2 This
practice functioned essentially as a tax shelter because, while ordinary
income tax applied to the reversion, the sponsor would still profit
from recapturing assets that grew in the plan tax-free." Congress was
concerned that companies were bucking the intent of ERISA by
creating plans, not for the sole benefit of employees, but also for their
own tax advantage."' The § 4980 exaction aimed to eliminate this
practice by taxing the reversion so that a sponsor could not gain a tax
benefit. Congress stated that the exaction was pegged at a fixed rate
and not scaled according to the extent that plan assets grew tax-free
because the latter structure would have been too complex."
plan.
(6) SUBSECTION NOT TO APPLY TO EMPLOYER IN
BANKRUPTCY. This subsection shall not apply to an employer who, as of
the termination date of the qualified plan, is in bankruptcy liquidation under
chapter 7 of title 11 of the United States Code or in similar proceedings
under State law.
26 U.S.C. § 4980 (1996).
108. Id § 4980(a).
109. Id. § 4980(d)(1).
110. Veal & Mackiewicz, supra note 21, at 215.
111. 26 U.S.C. § 4980(d)(6).
112. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Washington Watch: Pension Plans' Surphs Assets,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1985, at D2 ("[Rlecaptured funds have been used for general
corporate purposes, including financing acquisitions and defending against hostile
takeover bids."); Tamar Lewin, Business and the Law. Terminating Pension Plans,
N.Y. Times, July 10, 1984, at D2 ("[Ailmost every company with an overfunded plan
is at least considering whether to end the pension plan and take the cash.
(Sometimes, the motivation is less a need for cash than a fear that such an enticing
pool of money will make the company a takeover target.)"): David Wessel, Senate
Labor Panel Clears Bill To Limit Employers' Use Of Excess Pension Funds, Wall St.
J., Mar. 1, 1990, at A6. Between 1980 and 1987 employers terminated 1406
overfunded plans, recovering nearly $15.7 billion in residual assets. Stein, Taxing,
supra note 72, at 1131.
113. See Stein, Taxing, supra note 72, at 1132.
114. See Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax
Policies, 135 U. Pa. L Rev. 851, 891-93 (1987).
115. See Stein, Reversions, supra note 53, at 320 n.261.
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On the other hand, should an employer fail to meet its funding
standard,'1 6 IRC § 4971117 imposes a two-tier exaction. The first tier
sets forth a tax of ten percent of the amount of the funding deficiency,
imposed each year the deficiency exists.18 The second tier provides
an additional tax of one hundred percent of the deficiency amount if
the deficiency is not corrected by the time the first tier tax is
assessed." 9 The first tier exaction is nonwaivable, while the Secretary
of the Treasury may waive the second tier exaction. 120 It is important
to note that a § 4971 exaction can be assessed whether or not a
company terminates its plan, while plan termination is a sine qua non
of a § 4980 exaction.
Congress enacted § 4971 to "provide[] new and more effective
penalties where employers fail to meet the funding standards.''2
Congress believed that the previous sanctions failed to incentivize a
sponsor to fund its plan. 22 By imposing a substantial exaction under §
116. I expressly avoid using the term "underfunded" because a plan can be legally
funded yet be underfunded because it is unable to meet its liabilities if it were
terminated.
117. Section 4971 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) INITIAL TAX. For each taxable year of an employer who maintains a
plan to which section 412 applies, there is hereby imposed a tax of 10 percent
(5 percent in the case of a multiemployer plan) on the amount of the
accumulated funding deficiency under the plan, determined as of the end of
the plan year ending with or within such taxable year.
(b) ADDITIONAL TAX. In any case in which an initial tax is imposed by
subsection (a) on an accumulated funding deficiency and such accumulated
funding deficiency is not corrected within the taxable period, there is hereby
imposed a tax equal to 100 percent of such accumulated funding deficiency
to the extent not corrected.
(d) NOTIFICATION OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR. Before issuing
a notice of deficiency with respect to the tax imposed by subsection (a) or
(b), the Secretary shall notify the Secretary of Labor and provide him a
reasonable opportunity (but not more than 60 days) -
(1) to require the employer responsible for contributing to or under the
plan to eliminate the accumulated funding deficiency, or
(2) to comment on the imposition of such tax. In the case of a
multiemployer plan which is in reorganization under section 418, the same
notice and opportunity shall be provided to the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation.
(e) LIABILITY FOR TAX.
(1) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (2), the tax imposed by
subsection (a), (b), or (f) shall be paid by the employer responsible for
contributing to or under the plan the amount described in section
412(b)(3)(A).
26 U.S.C. § 4971 (1996).
118. Id. § 4971(a); Boren & Stein, supra note 39, § 9.10, at 40-40.4.
119. 26 U.S.C. § 4971(b).
120. Boren & Stein, supra note 39, § 9.10, at 40-40.4.
121. H. R. Rep. No. 93-807 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4694; S.
Rep. No. 93-383 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,4909.
122. H.R. Rep. No. 93-807 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4740; S.
Rep. No. 93-383 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,4941.
2452 (Vol. 70
IRC § 4980 IN BANKRUPTCY
4971, Congress intended to curtail substantially the deleterious impact
of underfunding.' 2
II. How THE BANKRUPTCY PRIORITY SCHEME ORDERS § 4980 AND
§ 4971 CLAIMS
Part I demonstrated the tax and pension regulatory requirements
pension plan sponsors must satisfy. This part delves into another
layer of statutory regulation: the Bankruptcy Code. Should a plan
sponsor file for bankruptcy protection, the Bankruptcy Code would
guide the operation of the sponsor and the administration of its
creditors' claims. The first section describes the payment of claims in
bankruptcy, focusing on certain unsecured tax claims for which the
Bankruptcy Code accords priority of payment over other unsecured
claims. The second section delves into a case law debate over how to
determine which tax claims should be considered "excise taxes" and
thus accorded priority treatment.
A. Claim Payment in Bankruptcy and the Priority Scheme
When an entity, be it an individual or a corporation, files for
bankruptcy protection, the federal bankruptcy regime corrals the
creditors of that entity into its grasp, effectively enjoining any one of
them from independently pursuing a remedy under state law.12' A
creditor's right to state law collection remedies is among the many
rights the Bankruptcy Code instantaneously alters overnight.
Another notable transformation is the lexical shift the Bankruptcy
Code forces upon debtors' 12 and creditors 26 that had been enforcing
their rights under state law. The Bankruptcy Code defines a "claim"
broadly as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured."127 In a liquidation proceeding, claims are generally paid
from the proceeds realized from a sale of the debtor's unencumbered
123. S. Rep. No. 93-383 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890,4941.
124. See Elizabeth Warren, Banknptcy Policy, 54 U. Chi. L Rev. 775, 782-89
(1987) [hereinafter Warren, Policy].
125. Truly, if bankruptcy is a world unto itself, it has taken that dictum to heart and
created its own language as well. The Bankruptcy Code defines a "debtor" as a
"person or municipality concerning which a case under... title [11] has been
commenced." 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (2000). "Person" is defined broadly to include an
"individual, partnership, and corporation." Id. § 101(41).
126. "Creditor" means an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at
the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." 11 U.S.C. §
101(10)(A).
127. Id. § 101(5)(A).
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assets, 128 while in a Chapter 11 reorganization the debtor repays its
creditors through a court-approved plan. 129
As a first principle, the Bankruptcy Code segregates creditors into
three rough but distinct categories: secured, priority unsecured, and
general unsecured. 3 Secured creditors are parties whose claims are
subject to a valid security interest or mortgage. 3' Unsecured priority
creditors have claims that are subject neither to a security interest nor
a mortgage, but belong to one of nine claim classes designated in
Bankruptcy Code § 507. This section entitles creditors to be paid
ahead of other unsecured creditors;3 2 however, courts narrowly
construe eligibility for priority treatment. 33  General unsecured
creditors hold claims that are not secured by any property and that are
not eligible for priority treatment.
The Bankruptcy Code entitles a secured creditor a secured claim up
to the value of the collateral underlying its security interest or
mortgage. 34 The secured creditor holds an unsecured claim to the
extent that a deficiency remains on the claim after accounting for the
collateral's value. 35 The Bankruptcy Code provides for the payment
of unsecured priority claims out of the unencumbered property of the
estate. 36  Priority claims are subdivided into a hierarchy of nine
distinct subclasses. 37 Each claim belonging to a given subclass is paid
in full before the next subclass can be paid at all. 38 If the assets in the
debtor's estate are insufficient to pay all the claims in a given subclass,
then the claims in that subclass split the remaining assets on a pro rata
basis. 39 Whatever assets remain after the satisfaction of priority
claims are distributed to general unsecured creditors. 40 This system is
necessary because bankruptcy estates usually do not have enough
funds to fully satisfy all of their creditors' claims.'4 '
If the debtor has filed under Chapter 7 or is liquidating under
Chapter 11, it pays creditors through the sale of all its assets.
Liquidating corporations generally cease to exist after liquidation. In
a reorganization under Chapter 11, however, a debtor intends to
128. See id. § 541.
129. See id. § 1129.
130. See 2 Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice 2d § 42.1 (William L. Norton, Jr.
ed., 1997) [hereinafter Norton].
131. See 11 U.S.C. § 506.
132. See id. § 507; 2 Norton, supra note 130, § 42.1.
133. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 9T 507.01 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1998)
[hereinafter Collier].
134. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
135. Id.
136. 2 Norton, supra note 130, § 42.1.
137. 11 U.S.C. § 507.
138. Id. § 726(b); 2 Norton, supra note 130, § 42.1.
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continue operating after bankruptcy. The priority scheme governs
both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases, whether or not the debtor sells
its assets to pay its creditors' claims.
This Note focuses on two specific, related types of unsecured claims
that fall into different creditor classes: the priority system's treatment
of tax claims based on § 4980 exactions on pension plan reversions
and § 4971 exactions on incidences of pension plan underfunding.
The next section will explain the labels that courts have attached to
these claims and the reasoning behind the relevant judicial
determinations.
B. The Excise Tax-Penalty Debate
The priority scheme treats excise taxes and tax penalty claims
differently.12 Excise taxes that a debtor owes to the government are
entitled to eighth priority distribution under § 507 of the Bankruptcy
Code.143 The legislative history of § 507 cites sales tax, estate and gift
taxes, gasoline and special fuel taxes, and wagering and truck taxes as
examples of excise taxes covered by this category.' As a debtor
emerges from Chapter 11 protection, it must pay the present value of
these claims in full within six years after they were assessed pursuant
to its plan of reorganization;4 - by similar logic, these claims are non-
dischargeable in a liquidation proceeding." The reason cited by
Congress for according priority to tax claims is that taxing authorities
are involuntary creditors and they cannot secure their claims be'fore a
tax is due. 47
In contrast, tax penalties that do not compensate for the
government's actual pecuniary loss are subordinated to general
unsecured claims."4 Section 726 sets out the following order of
distribution for the payment of unsecured claims out of the debtor's
unencumbered assets: (1) priority claims; (2) timely-filed general
142. This disparate treatment is a result of the broad array of tax claims that are
processed through the bankruptcy system. Accordingly, it is important to understand
that "excise tax" and "penalty" are merely two of many categories into which a tax
obligation may fall.
143. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(E).
144. 124 Cong. Rec. S34,016 (daily ed. Oct. 5. 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini)
("All Federal, State or local taxes generally considered or expressly treated as excises
are covered by this category, including sales tax, estate and gift taxes, gasoline and
special fuel taxes, and wagering and truck taxes.").
145. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C).
146. Id. § 523(a)(1)(A).
147. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 190 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6150-51; see also 3 Collier, supra note 133, 1 507.10[l][b]. However, this rationale is
wanting because not all involuntary creditors are accorded priority treatment. For
example, tort creditors are involuntary creditors whose claims are of the general
unsecured variety.
148. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4). Compensatory penalty claims are entitled to ninth
priority. Id. § 507(a)(9).
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unsecured claims; (3) tardily-filed general unsecured claims; (4) fines,
penalties, and non-compensatory damages; (5) post-petition interest;
and (6) any remaining surplus.1 49  The policy underlying the
subordination of non-compensatory penalties to general unsecured
claims is to protect unsecured creditors from paying for the debtor's
wrongdoing. 150 Section 726(a)(4) treats fines and penalties that the
debtor owes to a governmental unit the same as those owed to private
parties.15 1 If a claim is not clearly non-compensatory on its face and
the claimant argues that it is compensatory, a court will intervene to
analyze the operation of the fine or penalty. 52 Because the resolution
of such issues can dramatically alter the fortunes of competing
creditors, they are often resolved through litigation. For example, on
the question of whether a penalty for oil overcharges payable to the
Department of Energy was compensatory, the Federal Circuit
disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's theory of indirect restitution,
holding that a claim is non-compensatory when a company pays funds
not to actual victims but to the government in their stead.5 3
Courts are responsible for construing whether a claim should be
classified as an excise tax or penalty. Once a court holds a given claim
to be a penalty, it will determine whether the penalty is compensatory
or not; if it is a tax, then the court would classify it as a priority claim.
Often, it is not evident from the statutory source of a given exaction
whether it is intended as an excise tax or as a penalty. Indeed, these
terms are merely labels created by the Bankruptcy Code. The statutes
themselves offer scant insight; the IRC is not always explicit about
whether a given exaction is an excise tax or penalty, nor does the
Bankruptcy Code define these terms. 5 4  However, because the
disputed assessment may claim millions of dollars, a court's decision
regarding whether it is an excise tax or a penalty may determine
whether, and to what extent, general unsecured creditors are paid.
In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.'55 and In re Cassidy'56 are two
cases that represent the competing interpretive rubrics courts have
created in response to the excise tax-penalty question, which the
Supreme Court ultimately resolved in United States v. Reorganized
CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.'57 The Sixth Circuit in Mansfield
149. Id. § 726.
150. S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 96-97 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5882;
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 382 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6338.
151. See 6 Collier, supra note 133, 726.02[4].
152. See id.
153. Compare Tex.-Am. Oil Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 44 F.3d 1557, 1565-71 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), with In re Seneca Oil Co., 906 F.2d 1445, 1455-56 (10th Cir. 1990).
154. Stephen W. Sather et al., Borrowing From the Taxpayer: State and Local Tax
Claims In Bankruptcy, 4 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 201,219 (1996).
155. 942 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1991).
156. 983 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1992).
157. 518 U.S. 213 (1996).
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employed a plain language analysis and held that a § 4971 claim for an
underfunding assessment was an excise tax, 58 while the Tenth Circuit
in Cassidy, utilizing an extratextual approach, held that a claim for an
assessment on an early retirement account withdrawal arising under
IRC § 72(t) was a penalty.'59 The following subsections probe deeper
into these varying methodologies."6°
1. The Extratextual Approach
The lower courts in Mansfield and the Tenth Circuit in Cassidy
spearheaded the ascendance of the extratextual approach for
resolving excise tax-penalty questions. While some of the courts
employing the extratextual approach discussed general bankruptcy
policy, none thoroughly commented or relied upon the interplay of
the various federal policies in reaching their conclusions. The
bankruptcy court in Mansfield inquired into the purpose of § 4971,
stating that the exaction's label was not dispositive. 6' The court
reiterated a four-part test that the federal courts created in response
to City of New York v. Feiring.62 The test defines a "tax" as follows:
(1) [a] voluntary pecuniary burden, regardless of name, laid upon
individuals or property; (2) [i]mposed by, or under authority of the
legislature; (3) [f]or public purposes, including the purposes of
defraying expenses of government or undertakings authorized by it;
and (4) [u]nder the police or taxing power of the governmental
unit.16"
The court found that the underfunding assessment provision met all
but the third prong, which it determined by inquiring into the purpose
of § 4971.16 After a review of the legislative history of § 4971, the
court held that Congress, through the enactment of the underfunding
assessment provision, aimed to punish employers that abused
ERISA's minimum funding standards." - The court also pointed to
the non-compensatory mechanics of the underfunding assessment
158. See infra text accompanying notes 197-207.
159. See infra text accompanying notes 174-182.
160. It is important to note that litigation in the line of cases leading up to the
Fabricators decision encompasses many types of exactions, not only those related to
pension plans.
161. See In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 80 B.R. 395, 398 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1987).
162. 313 U.S. 283 (1941). The Feiring Court defined the exactions to which priority
treatment extended as "those pecuniary burdens laid upon individuals or their
property, regardless of their consent, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of
government or of undertakings authorized by it." Id. at 285.
163. Mansfield, 80 B.R. at 398 (citing In re Lorber Indus. of Cal., Inc., 675 F.2d
1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Skjonsby Truck Line, Inc., 39 B.R. 971 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1984); In re Farmers Frozen Food Co., 221 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. Calif. 1963)).
164. Id. at 399-400.
165. Id. at 400.
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provision for support; the provision assessed an exaction regardless of
whether a company corrected its funding deficiency or whether the
PBGC assumed control and disbursed payments under the plan.,66
The Mansfield district court agreed with the bankruptcy court and
added to the analysis.167  To support its conclusion that the
underfunding assessment provision was a penalty, the court reasoned
that the words "penalties," "penalize," and "sanctions" in the
legislative history of the underfunding assessment provision
demonstrated its punitive intent."6 The district court also rejected the
inference that § 4971 must be an excise tax because prior courts had to
assume as much before reaching the question of whether post-petition
underfunding claims could be entitled to first priority as
administrative expense claims. 69 The court held that non-pecuniary
loss penalties could not be afforded administrative status.7 0 The court
stated that the policy embodied in Bankruptcy Code § 726(a)(4),
which subordinates non-pecuniary loss penalties to general unsecured
claims, is intended to deny priority to all non-pecuniary loss penalties,
regardless of whether claimants attempt to color them as
administrative expenses or excise taxes.17 ' While the court did refer to
how the policy of protecting innocent creditors from a debtor's
punitive debts supports the subordination of penalties to unsecured
claims,7 it did not analyze the specific tax or pension policies behind
§ 4971.
The Tenth Circuit in Cassidy employed the extratextual approach
to IRC § 72(t), 73 holding that the provision is a penalty.74 IRC § 72(t)
imposes an exaction, or, in IRC parlance, an "additional tax," of ten
percent on the amount of an early withdrawal from a pension plan
166. See id.
167. See In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 120 B.R. 862, 865 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
168. Id. (quoting S. Rep. 93-383 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4890,
4909-10,4941).
169. Id. at 865-66 (citing In re A.C. Williams, 81 B.R. 437 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986);
In re Overly-Hautz, 57 B.R. 932 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986), affd 81 B.R. 434 (N.D.
Ohio 1987)).
170. Id. at 866.
171. Id. at 866-67.
172. Id. at 864.
173. Section 72(t) provides, in pertinent part:
(t) 10-percent additional tax on early distributions from qualified retirement
plans.
(1)Imposition of additional tax. If any taxpayer receives any amount from
a qualified retirement plan (as defined in section 4974(c)), the taxpayer's tax
under this chapter for the taxable year in which such amount is received
shall be increased by an amount equal to 10 percent of the portion of such
amount which is includible in gross income.
26 U.S.C. § 72(t) (1994).
174. See United States v. Dumler (In re Cassidy), 983 F.2d 161, 164 (10th Cir.
1992).
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fund.175 The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that the extratextual
approach applied only to state, not federal, obligations, citing United
States v. New York176 and United States v. Sotelo,'"7 two pre-
Bankruptcy Code cases in which the Supreme Court looked beyond
the statutory text to decide whether particular federal obligations
were entitled to priority.
7
With this precedential support, the Cassidy court then applied the
Feiring four-prong test. In order to determine the third prong-
namely, whether the obligation was imposed for a public purpose,
such as the purpose of defraying the cost of government-the court
analyzed the purpose of the early withdrawal assessment provision."
The court concluded that Congress enacted § 72(t) to advance a
multitude of purposes,"0 rendering the Feiring test inconclusive on the
issue. The court then turned to bankruptcy policy to resolve the tax-
penalty question. The court cited the policy of protecting innocent
creditors from paying for the debtor's bad conduct, a policy
articulated by the Supreme Court in Simonson v. Granquist.Y1
Applying this principle without referring to the applicable tax and
pension policies behind § 72(t), the court concluded that the
bankruptcy context nullified the deterrent purpose of the early
withdrawal assessment provision because the cost of noncompliance
would be borne by the innocent creditors, rather than the culpable
debtor."l Consequently, the court held that § 72(t) was a non-
pecuniary penalty and thus not entitled to priority.' 3
Another pertinent case applying the extratextual approach is In re
C-T of Virginia, Inc." The Fourth Circuit was faced with the
question of whether an overfunding exaction assessed pursuant to
IRC § 4980 was an excise tax or penalty. After it declared that the
legislative history of § 4980 shed no light on whether the exaction was
an excise tax or penalty,L'- the Fourth Circuit adopted the reasoning of
175. 26 U.S.C. § 72(t).
176. 315 U.S. 510 (1942).
177. 436 U.S. 268 (1978).
178. Cassidy, 983 F.2d at 163; see also Sotelo, 436 U.S. at 275; New York, 315 U.S.
at 515.
179. Cassidy, 983 F.2d at 163-64.
180. Specifically, the purposes cited by the court were "to prevent retirement plans
from being treated as savings accounts, to recapture a measure of tax benefits that
have been provided prior to the withdrawal, and to deter the use of retirement funds
for nonretirement purposes." Id. at 164.
181. 369 U.S. 38 (1962). The Sinonson Court stated that "[enforcement of
penalties against the estates of bankrupts... would serve not to punish the delinquent
taxpayers, but rather their entirely innocent creditors." Id. at 41.
182. See Cassidy, 983 F.2d at 164.
183. Id. at 165.
184. 128 B.R. 628 (Bankr. W.D. Va.). rev'd 135 B.R. 501 (W.D. Va. 1991). affd 977
F.2d 137 (4th Cir. 1992).
185. C-T, 977 F.2d at 140.
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the district court.186 The C-T district court disavowed reliance on the
conclusion of the lower courts in Mansfield, while nonetheless
expressly rejecting the Sixth Circuit's plain language methodology in
Mansfield.187 The district court instead relied on New Neighborhoods,
Inc. v. West Virginia Workers' Compensation Fund,'s8 a Fourth Circuit
precedent that provided an interpretive gloss on the Feiring test.89
The New Neighborhoods court defined an excise tax as "an indirect
tax, one not directly imposed upon persons or property, and one that
is 'imposed on the performance of an act, the engaging in any
occupation, or the enjoyment or [sic] a privilege. ' '' 90 The district
court's conclusion did not consider bankruptcy, tax, or pension
policies. 9' Instead, the court held that the underfunding assessment
provision demonstrated "substantially more of the attributes of an
excise tax than of a penalty,"'" finding, without substantive
comparison, that § 4971 was indistinguishable from other exactions
listed in IRC Subtitles D193 and E,194 including the gas guzzler tax 95
and the tax on ozone-depleting chemicals.196 This rationale is dubious
because it sidesteps the extratextual analysis it claims to employ, cites
Feiring but does not faithfully apply it, and rejects Mansfield while
nonetheless relying upon the labels and the proximate location of
other exactions in the IRC subtitles with the words "excise taxes" in
their headings.
2. The Plain Language Approach
The Sixth Circuit in Mansfield rejected the lower courts' reliance on
legislative history and extratextually-driven analysis.197 Instead, the
186. It seems troubling that the Fourth Circuit and the district court did not address
IRC § 7806(b)'s exhortation that "[njo inference, implication, or presumption of
legislative construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the location or grouping
of any particular section or provision or portion of this title." 26 U.S.C. § 7806(b)
(1994).
187. See C-T, 135 B.R. at 503.
188. 886 F.2d 714 (4th Cir. 1989).
189. C-T, 135 B.R. at 503.
190. New Neighborhoods, 886 F.2d at 719 (alteration in original) (citations
omitted).
191. At a critical juncture in the Fourth Circuit's opinion, the court stated, "The
legislative history apparently gives little or no clue as to the answer to [whether § 4980
is an excise tax or penalty]. Nor do the underlying background facts point
conclusively in one direction or the other." United States v. Unsecured Creditors'
Comm. (In re C-T of Va., Inc.), 977 F.2d 137, 140 (4th Cir. 1992). This was a prime
opportunity for the court to delve into the various policies behind the provision and
the context in which it was being applied.
192. C-T, 135 B.R. at 503.
193. This subtitle is entitled "Miscellaneous Excise Taxes."
194. This subtitle is entitled "Alcohol, Tobacco and Certain Other Excise Taxes."
195. 26 U.S.C. § 4064 (1994).
196. Id. § 4681.
197. See In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., 942 F.2d 1055, 1060-61 (6th Cir. 1991).
2460 [Vol. 70
IRC § 4980 IN BANKRUPTCY
Sixth Circuit relied on the plain language principle of statutory
construction that the Supreme Court established in United States v.
Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,"gs the (in)famous "comma case."'' The
Ron Pair decision set forth the proposition that where the language of
a provision was plain, "the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms."'  The court of appeals believed that, because
Congress did not define "excise tax" in the Bankruptcy Code, courts
were not meant to provide a special definition for the term in
bankruptcy."0 ' As a second support for its decision, the court stated
that Congress extended priority treatment to all obligations that the
federal government labels as "excise taxes," even those that are meant
to regulate undesirable conduct.22  According to the court's logic,
because § 4971 was listed under an IRC heading bearing the title
"Miscellaneous Excise Taxes," the provision was plainly an excise tax
for all federal purposes, including bankruptcy, and should be accorded
priority treatment under then-Bankruptcy Code § 507(7)(E).2 3
Specifically, the court stated: "[W]e will not independently decide
whether Congress meant 'excise tax' when it said 'excise tax."'"
The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument that § 4971 is based on the
bankruptcy policy of preventing innocent creditors from paying for
the misdeeds of the debtor, stating that "we needn't concern ourselves
xvith that policy decision. Congress has already made that choice.""
Nor did the court delve into the tax and pension policies behind §
4971.1 Furthermore, the court ruled that application of the Feiring
test was limited to non-federal taxes because it was designed to
198. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
199. See Daniel J. Bussel, Textualisn's Failures: A Study' of Overruled Bankniptcy
Decisions, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 887, 894 (2000). In Ron Pair, the Supreme Court's
decision hinged on the placement of the fifth of seven commas in Bankruptcy Code §
506(b). See id. at 895-96.
200. Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241 (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,485
(1917)).
201. Mansfield, 942 F.2d at 1058.
202. Id.
203. The numeration of the section governing the priority treatment of excise taxes
has changed twice since its enactment. At the inception of the Bankruptcy Code in
1978, the excise tax priority section was located at § 507(6)(E); the 1984 Amendments
displaced it to § 507(7)(E). Since the enactment of the 1994 Amendments it has been
located at § 507(8)(E).
204. Mansfield, 942 F.2d at 1059.
205. Id.
206. The court repeatedly referred to § 4971 as a "tax" without discussing what tax
policy interest would be advanced by its holding. See id. at 1058 n.3, 1059. Citing the
absence of the words "excise tax" and "tax" in the Bankruptcy Code, the court also
rejected the proposition that the bankruptcy context requires an analysis that, at the
very least, acknowledges the confluence of various interests in that context. Id. at
1058 ("[W]e are not persuaded that Congress intended to give a special bankruptcy-
context meaning to those words.").
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prevent state and local authorities from promoting their claims in
bankruptcy simply by labeling them "taxes.
21
3. The Fabricators Functional Test
The approach espoused by the Sixth Circuit in Mansfield brought
the circuits into conflict on the issue of how to resolve excise tax-
penalty questions. To review, the Sixth Circuit in Mansfield applied a
restrictive plain language principle to read § 4971 as an excise tax; the
Tenth Circuit in Cassidy applied an extratextual analysis, examining
the purpose of the underlying tax provision and finding it a penalty
pursuant to the Feiring test; and the Fourth Circuit in C-T held § 4980
to be an excise tax despite its dubious methodology. No court of
appeals has comprehensively analyzed the different policy interests at
stake and, as this Note shall illustrate, the Supreme Court would soon
join in this deficiency.
The Supreme Court ended the conflict by clarifying the appropriate
test in United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.2 '8
The Court, in deciding whether an underfunding assessment levied
pursuant to IRC § 4971 was an excise tax or penalty, expressly
repudiated Mansfield's plain language approach to excise tax-penalty
determinations. Instead, the Court announced that the proper test
requires courts to undertake a "functional examination" of the
contested statute, which involves analyzing its mechanics and
legislative history.2°
The Supreme Court began its analysis by dismissing the proposition
first enunciated in Mansfield that courts should restrict their statutory
analysis to the plain language of a federal tax provision when
interpreting whether a particular exaction was a "tax" for bankruptcy
purposes. 210 The Court, citing Feiring and its progeny for support,
pointed out that, historically, when the Court considered such
questions in the context of § 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act it "rested its
answer directly on the operation of the provision."211 It noted that it
had done so in New York and Sotelo and, absent any congressional
directive in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 to change course,
there was no reason to deviate from this interpretive method.
21 2
The Court began its functional examination of the underfunding
assessment provision by distinguishing a tax from a penalty, quoting
207. Id. at 1060.
208. 518 U.S. 213 (1996).
209. See id. at 224.
210. See id. at 222-24.
211. Id. at 220. Justice Thomas, the lone dissenter, claimed that the Court should
not make such an inquiry into federal taxes. See id. at 230 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
212. Id. at 223 (quoting 124 Cong. Rec. S32,416 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1978) (remarks of
Rep. DeConcini)).
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United States v. LaFranca: "A tax is an enforced contribution to
provide for the support of government; a penalty.., is an exaction
imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act."21-'3 The Court
then stated that the two-tiered structure of § 4971, whereby the IRS
assesses a one hundred percent exaction on top of the obligatory ten
percent when a plan sponsor fails to correct a funding deficiency,
evinced the "obviously penal character" of the provision.21'4 Quoting
the punitive language in the underfunding provision's legislative
history, the Court concluded that § 4971 was a penalty for the
purposes of the bankruptcy priority provisions. - 5  Specifically, the
legislative history of § 4971 stated:
[ERISA] provides new and more effective penalties where
employers fail to meet the funding standards.... [The prior
procedure has] proved to be defective since it does not directly
penalize those responsible for the underfunding. For this reason,
the bill places the obligation for funding and the penalty for
underfunding on the person on whom it belongs-namely, the
employer.216
The Court then noted the underfunding provision's "patently punitive
function" and held that it was a penalty.2 7 However, the Court failed
to discuss the bankruptcy, pension, and tax policies that affect the
operation of § 4971 in the bankruptcy context.23 8
4. Post-Fabricators Case Law
The Eighth Circuit in In re Juvenile Shoe Corp.219 was one of the
first courts of appeals to apply the Supreme Court's functional test set
out in Fabricators. After applying the Fabricators test to exactions
levied pursuant to IRC § 4980, the overfunding assessment provision,
the court held that the claims were excise taxes entitled to priority.?0
The Juvenile Shoe court examined the language of § 49801 as a first
213. United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568,572 (1931).
214. Fabricators, 518 U.S. at 224-25.
215. See id at 225-26.
216. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, at 28 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670,4694).
217. Id.
218. Indeed, the Court, by relying on legislative history alone, appears to be
considering § 4971 in a vacuum and strictly on the basis of its hypothetical operation,
not its actual operation during bankruptcy. Perhaps a comparative analysis of the
strength of various policy interests both in and out of bankruptcy would have shed
more light on how courts should treat § 4971.
219. 99 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 1996).
220. See id. at 902.
221. At the time, § 4980 provided, in pertinent part:
(a) Imposition of tax. There is hereby imposed a tax of 15 percent of the
amount of any employer reversion from a qualified plan.
(b) Liability for tax. The tax imposed by subsection (a) shall be paid by the
employer maintaining the plan.
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step in its analysis.' 2 In the court's view, the language of the statute
proved inconclusive.' 2 The court, therefore, considered the operation
and legislative history of the overfunding assessment provision.224
Although the court found the legislative history inconclusive, it
determined that Congress intended to assess an excise tax through §
4980.2 In reaching its conclusion, the Eighth Circuit contrasted the
overfunding assessment provision with § 4971, the underfunding
provision. 226  The court pointed out that, while the underfunding
provision deters conduct that is illegal under ERISA, Congress
regulates permissible conduct-namely, employer reversions- under
§ 4980.227 Furthermore, the court was persuaded by the contrast
between the punitive character of § 4971's second-tier one hundred
percent exaction rate and § 4980's then-fifteen percent flat rate,
characterizing the flat rate as a simplified means of recovering lost tax
revenues.' The court compared § 4980 with other excise taxes
affecting consumptive behavior and noted that, though the
overfunding provision had a regulatory function, such a function did
not automatically render § 4980 a penalty.229 While the court
thoroughly discussed the purpose and operation of § 4980, it did not
compare the various policy interests at stake, nor did it specify reasons
for favoring tax policy in the bankruptcy context.230
Other post-Fabricators cases have applied the functional test to
exactions arising under federal law, demonstrating the entrenchment
of this test in multiple contexts. The tax-penalty question arose in In
re Mouniert23 as a preliminary issue regarding whether an exaction
under IRC § 72(t), the early withdrawal assessment provision at issue
in Cassidy, was dischargeable under Bankruptcy Code § 523.2 The
bankruptcy court in Mounier determined whether the early
withdrawal assessment provision was a tax or penalty before analyzing
whether it was dischargeable. 3  The Mounier court, employing the
Fabricators test, relied heavily on the Tenth Circuit's characterization
26 U.S.C. § 4980 (1986).
222. See Juvenile Shoe, 99 F.3d at 901.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 902.
226. Id. at 902-03.
227. Id. at 903.
228. Id. at 902.
229. Id.
230. The court concluded that § 4980 "primarily raises revenue for the operation of
the government" and thus "fits the Supreme Court's definition of an excise tax." Id.
At this juncture, the Juvenile Shoe court could have discussed the interplay between
the tax policy interest in raising revenue and the relevant bankruptcy and pension
policies. This kind of analysis would have provided a prime opportunity to explain
why tax policy should triumph.
231. 232 B.R. 186 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1998).
232. Id. at 190 ; see also 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1994).
233. Mounier, 232 B.R. at 190.
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of § 72(t) in Cassidy.' The court clarified that taxpayers must first
pay ordinary income tax on early withdrawals from qualified
retirement accounts pursuant to which the § 72(t) exaction represents
an additional obligation. 235 Alluding to the purpose of the early
withdrawal provision, the court stated that § 72(t) was designed to
prevent the treatment of retirement accounts as savings accounts and
"to deter the use of retirement funds for non-retirement purposes."' 36
Thus, following Cassidy, the court held that the early withdrawal
provision was not intended to support the government and, therefore,
was a penalty, not a tax.37 Interestingly, while the court mentioned
that § 72(t) was not meant to raise revenue for the government and
that granting the exaction priority treatment would disadvantage
innocent creditors by diminishing the bankruptcy estate, these issues
were not essential to its conclusion?-
The Tenth Circuit in In re Sunnyside Coal Co." applied the
Fabricators test to premiums assessed under the Coal Industry Retiree
Health Benefit Act of 1992 ("Coal Act").2' Under the Coal Act, the
debtor was one of many companies required to pay premiums to fund
special pension and health benefit plans for retired coal workers.'
The Tenth Circuit followed the analysis and holding of the Second
Circuit in LTV Steel Corp. v. Shalala (In re Chateaugay Corp.),21
which found that the coal premium provision was a tax because it
created involuntary burdens intended for a public purpose 4 "3 While
the Tenth Circuit did not overtly mention tax or bankruptcy policy, it
did refer to the Coal Act's policy of protecting the retirement of coal
miners, especially those employed by companies no longer in
business!' The court emphasized the "undeniably involuntary nature
of these assessments as crafted by the Coal Act to directly remediate
continuing crises in the nation's production of coal" and held the
premium to be a tax 5
III. PROPOSING A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: AMEND § 4980
This part explores solutions to the current treatment of IRC § 4980
in the bankruptcy context. The first section examines the effect of the
234. Id at 191.
235. Id at 191-92.
236. Id at 192-93.
237. Id. at 193.
238. See id. at 192-93.
239. 146 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 1998).
240. Id at 1274-76; see Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776, 3036-56 (1992) (codified
at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-22 (1994)).
241. Sunnyside, 146 F.3d at 1275-76.
242. 53 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 1995).
243. Id. at 498; see Sunnyside, 146 F.3d at 1276-77.
244. Sunnyside, 146 F.3d at 1277-78.
245. Id. at 1278.
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present state of the law on the various policies implicated when claims
under §§ 4971 and 4980 become enmeshed in the bankruptcy priority
scheme. The second section explores the feasibility of a judicial
solution, while the final section proposes four legislative solutions,
favoring the narrowest course of action-namely, amending IRC §
4980.
A. Unraveling the Policy Choices
Bankruptcy, pension, and tax policies collide when claims arising
from the underfunding and overfunding assessment provisions are
filtered through the bankruptcy priority scheme. The relevant
bankruptcy policies are maximizing asset distribution to general
unsecured creditors and preventing innocent creditors from paying for
the debtor's malfeasance. A key tax policy specifically behind § 4980
is to compensate the government upon termination of a pension plan
for the accrual of tax benefits during the life of the plan. Section 4971
demonstrates the pension policy of deterring non-compliance with the
minimum funding requirements that secure retirement income.
The Supreme Court did well in Fabricators to permit bankruptcy
courts to inquire beyond the plain language of tax provisions under
which claims arise. However, the Supreme Court's approach was
narrow in vision. The Court made no reference to the competing
bankruptcy, tax, and pension policies that were implicit in the issue it
faced. When two or more federal statutes conflict, the question about
how to reconcile their competing policies will be difficult. The Court
in Fabricators had the opportunity to address a policy conflict
between federal tax, pension, and bankruptcy law, but instead viewed
the issue as purely a problem of statutory construction.246
The effect of Fabricators is that lower courts facing a tax-penalty
dispute apply a test that analyzes the nature of a statute's operation.247
In some cases, this analysis may not lead to a clear-cut answer.
Juvenile Shoe exemplified this problem, expressly stating that neither
the operation nor the legislative history of § 4980 was conclusive on
whether the provision imposed an excise tax or not.248 The Juvenile
Shoe court nonetheless believed that on balance the overfunding
246. The Fabricators opinion is not the first instance where the Court has taken a
narrow approach to solving bankruptcy problems; in fact, it seems to reflect a regular
pattern. One commentator, after reviewing every Supreme Court bankruptcy
decision, concluded that the Court consistently overlooked substantive bankruptcy
policy and decided bankruptcy disputes solely on interpretive grounds. See Karen M.
Gebbia-Pinetti, Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code: An Empirical Study of the Supreme
Court's Bankruptcy Decisions, 3 Chap. L. Rev. 173, 268-82 (2000). The Court's course
of action has effectively impeded the development of substantive bankruptcy policy.
See id. at 278-82; see also Carlos J. Cuevas, The Rehnquist Court, Strict Statutory
Construction and the Bankruptcy Code, 42 Clev. St. L. Rev. 435, 477-82 (1994).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 208-218.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 219-229.
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assessment provision resembled an excise tax (or, rather, did not
resemble a penalty). Considering that the court admitted its
inconclusiveness on the issue and yet awarded priority treatment to
the § 4980 claims, it is difficult to conclude that the court followed the
bankruptcy principle of construing priority status narrowly. Indeed,
overreliance on an interpretive rubric may cause courts, like Juvenile
Shoe, to lose sight of important policies that undergird the bankruptcy
system.
The end result in Juvenile Shoe was that the IRS's claim for
overfunding assessments diminished the distribution to general
unsecured creditors. In its analysis, the Juvenile Shoe court compared
the overfunding assessment provision to § 4971, the underfunding
provision, noting that § 4971's two-tiered structure demonstrated its
punitive character. If the structural distinction of the two provisions
was the key factor in the court's decision, then it would reach the
opposite conclusion if the case were decided today because Congress
has since amended § 4980. That section now has a two-tiered structure
as well-it taxes twenty percent of the original reversion, which rises
to fifty percent should the sponsor fail to divert the funds into a
replacement plan. The previous version exacted a fifteen percent
assessment uniformly on residual assets. In the legislative history of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 ("OBRA"),2 9
Congress stated that the fifteen percent rate failed to recapture tax
benefits accruing to the plan sponsor through tax deductions on funds
dedicated to the plan.'- - Congress explained that the addition of the
fifty percent rate "provide[s] an incentive for an employer terminating
a defined benefit plan to maintain a qualified retirement plan
following the termination or to provide benefit increases to plan
participants before terminating the plan."'"
If courts consider the changes in structure and language to the
overfunding assessment provision, they may be inclined to find that
the overfunding assessment provision is a non-compensatory tax
provision and thus not entitled to priority. Surely, one can now argue
that the operation-which is the precise aspect of a disputed provision
that courts are required to analyze under the Fabricators test-of §
4980 is non-compensatory and punitive. The overfunding assessment
provision wields the threat of a fifty percent exaction to encourage the
good behavior of an employer-namely, to share the reversion with its
249. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified in scattered titles of the United
States Code).
250. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-964, at 1145-46 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2374, 2850-51; H.R. Rep. No. 101-881, at 332 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017, 2334 ("[Tlhe committee believes it is appropriate to increase the
excise tax to better approximate the tax benefits of the income deferral.").
251. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-964, at 114546 (1990), reprinted in 1990




employees. z However, some courts may defer to the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Juvenile Shoe, reading it as persuasive precedential
authority, and reject the argument that the overfunding provision is a
penalty as a result of § 4980's new language and structure. Indeed,
Congress used neutral language in the legislative history to describe
why it amended § 4980, and what little it did say may lead a court to
conclude that the provision functions as a compensatory tax under the
Fabricators test. 3  Moreover, a court may not view Congress's
revision of § 4980 in context. The revision of § 4980 was an
infinitesimal provision that did not warrant significant debate or
commentary as part of OBRA, which was a sprawling omnibus statute
that made myriad revenue-related changes across the spectrum of the
United States Code. Consequently, a court, reading the legislative
history alone, may not feel constrained under the Fabricators test to
upset the holding in Juvenile Shoe because the plainly-written
legislative history is bereft of punitive language.
If courts do not conclude that § 4980 is a non-compensatory
penalty, they may need legislative guidance from Congress. Though
legislative solutions are slow in the making and offer no greater
promise of perfect results than judicial solutions, legislative action
may be the only way to reset the courts' approach to the overfunding
assessment provision in the bankruptcy context. Specifically,
Congress needs to implement a solution that elevates bankruptcy
policy over tax policy.'
The bankruptcy policies on which Congress should focus with
respect to claims arising as a result of pension plan overfunding and
underfunding are maximizing distribution to unsecured creditors255
252. See Boren & Stein, supra note 39, § 17.15.50, at 119.
253. The following passage provides the extent of Congress's remarks on why it
amended § 4980:
Congress recognized that contributions to [pension] plans, as well as the
earnings on such contributions, are intended to provide for the pension
benefits of plan participants. To the extent that amounts in such plans are
not used the [sic] pension purposes, Congress believed that the tax treatment
of reversions, should recognize that the tax on earnings on pension funds is
deferred and, thus, the benefits of this treatment should be recaptured. In
many cases, a 15-percent excise tax is not sufficient to recaputre [sic] that
[sic] tax benefits received. Therefore, the committee believes it is
appropriate to increase the excise tax to better approximate the tax benefits
of the income deferral. The committe [sic] also believes it is appropriate to
structure the excise tax to provide an incentive for an employer terminating
a defined benefit plan to maintain a qualified retirement plan following the
termination or to provide benefit increases to plan participants before
terminating the plan.
H.R. Rep. No. 101-881, at 332 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017, 2334.
254. For a discussion of my legislative proposal, see infra Part III.C.
255. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 (1994) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "maximum and equitable distribution for creditors" is a core
bankruptcy policy); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc., 151 B.R. 684, 693
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re A.J. Lane & Co., 113 B.R. 821, 824 (Bankr. D. Mass.
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and protecting innocent creditors from the debtor's malfeasance.'
First, the policy of maximizing distribution to creditors is often cited
as a fundamental bankruptcy goal, which is balanced by the policy of
offering the debtor a fresh start. Pursuant to the policy of maximized
distribution, unsecured creditors are grouped together and paid a
prorated share of the bankruptcy estate. The trustee's avoidance
power, permitting him or her to reach back into the pre-petition
period to avoid transactions and prevent a creditor from selectively
dismembering the debtor's estate, also demonstrates the advancement
of this policy.' Second, beyond the general bankruptcy policy of
protecting creditors is the specific protection of creditors against a
debtor's -wrongdoing. 8  For example, the Bankruptcy Code
recognizes that innocent unsecured creditors should not bear the
pecuniary burden of the debtor's penalties. Accordingly, Bankruptcy
Code § 726 subordinates penalty claims to unsecured claims.25
Additionally, courts approve payment of the debtor's attorneys from
the estate in order to protect creditors from paying for unreasonable
billing practices.'
With a grasp of the relevant bankruptcy policies, one must also
examine the competing tax and pension policies that generally
undergird the overfunding and underfunding assessment provisions.
Section 4971, but not § 4980, advances the important pension policy of
1990) ("The protection of general creditors from unreasonable fees enjoying first
priority is central to the bankruptcy policy favoring a fair distribution to creditors.");
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297
("Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under which all
creditors are treated equally."); 2 Norton, supra note 130, § 36:4, at 36-8 ("The stay is
also intended to protect creditors by promoting the bankruptcy policy of equality of
distribution among claimants."); Gregory G. Hesse, On the Edge: Ninth Circuit Slams
Shut the "Back Door" Access to Patented Technology, 1999 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. (April
1999), 1999 ABI JNL. LEXIS 41, at *17-*18 ("The First Circuit [in Institut Pasteur v.
Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1120 (1997)]
has concluded, at least in the context of assumption of a non-exclusive patent license,
that the bankruptcy policy of maximizing equal distributions to all creditors should
prevail over the patent policy of protecting the rights of the patent holder.").
256. See In re Fishgold, 206 B.R. 50. 55 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing -the
policies of fresh start and protecting an innocent but wronged creditor"); In re Joe-
Gal Pizza, Inc., No. 87B-11503 (HCB), 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 2756, at 012 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. May 9, 1989); In re Mako, Inc., 102 B.R. 809, 812 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1988)
("A policy of flexibility pervades the Bankruptcy Code with the ultimate aim of
protecting creditors."); S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 96 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5882 (stating that § 724(a) embodies the bankruptcy policy of
"protecting unsecured creditors from the debtor's wrongdoing").
257. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544,545, 546 (1994).
258. See Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38, 40-41 (1962) ("Tax penalties are
imposed at least in part as punitive measures against persons who have been guilty of
some default or wrong. Enforcement of penalties against the estates of bankrupts,
however, would serve not to punish the delinquent taxpayers, but rather their entirely
innocent creditors.").
259. See 11 U.S.C. § 724(a).
260. See id. § 330.
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guaranteeing employees' retirement income through minimum
funding rules. The underfunding assessment provision strongly
advances this pension policy by punishing incidences of underfunding
with a ten percent exaction on the deficiency amount, which increases
in severity to one hundred percent if such behavior continues.26" ' In
contrast, when a plan sponsor triggers the operation of the
overfunding assessment provision the plan ceases to exist.
Accordingly, in the standard termination scenario, the pension
security system neatly ties its loose ends by requiring the plan sponsor
first to pay its obligations under the plan before claiming the residual
assets.262 Once a sponsor pays its pension obligations, pension policy
is no longer relevant and it is tax policy that takes primacy. The tax
policy stands against the reversion in order to recover the tax benefits
that the plan sponsor would enjoy had it been able to recapture plan
assets that had grown tax-free. Similarly, tax policy is embodied in the
underfunding provision by penalizing plan sponsors which fail to meet
the funding requirements of ERISA, a government program that
confers special tax benefits to qualified plan sponsors.
So far, courts have concluded that § 4971 claims are penalties.263
Thus, the Bankruptcy Code subordinates claims for underfunding
assessments to the claims of general unsecured creditors. This is
certainly consistent with the bankruptcy policy of protecting innocent
creditors from a debtor's misdeeds. Distribution to unsecured
creditors is also maximized because these claims do not diminish the
estate as priority claimants. In contrast, overfunding claims are
entitled to priority status 6.2 4 According priority status to these claims
does not comport with bankruptcy policy. Rather, tax policy defeats
bankruptcy policy in this case, even though the applicable tax policy is
nearly mooted in the bankruptcy context, as explained below.
The collection of § 4980 exactions outside of bankruptcy validly
serves the tax policy of recovering tax benefits.26 5 However, in the
bankruptcy process a debtor-in-possession is acting not only for itself
but for the benefit of its creditors as well .2 6 A debtor usually chooses
to terminate a pension plan not to recover assets from a tax shelter-
which is Congress's typical concern outside the insolvency context261-
but, rather, to augment the bankruptcy estate in order to maximize
distribution to creditors."s Furthermore, a terminating debtor has not
deliberately overfunded its plan in order to recover tax benefits. That
261. See supra text accompanying notes 28-37.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 70-77.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 208-217.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 219-229.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 103-111; see also Stein, Taxing, supra note
72, passim.
266. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1107 (1994).
267. See supra text accompanying notes 112-115.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
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is, the debtor is not intentionally terminating its overfunded plan
solely to retain the residual assets. Rather, the debtor has become
insolvent when, coincidentally, its plan's actuarial basis has caused the
plan to be overfunded. Absent bankruptcy, such a plan would not be
terminated, and its overfunded state likely would have leveled off with
the passage of time as retiring employees extracted benefits."
Furthermore, once a plan sponsor is in bankruptcy, it is not required
to terminate its plan. There will be parties that are in favor of
termination-namely, the creditors-and others that are against-the
employees; but neither group can twist the debtor's arm and force
termination."z0 Therefore, assessing overfunding exactions on debtors
and according them priority treatment is a misguided practice that
does not account for the actual reasons behind a debtor's plan
termination.
In fact, the most troubling consequence, one that improperly
defeats pension policy, is that priority treatment of § 4980 claims
creates a disincentive for an employer to fund its plan adequately. For
example, before it files for bankruptcy protection, a failing company
may be encouraged by its creditors to stop funding its pension plans.
This course of action would yield a diminution in pension obligation
payments and confer unsecured status upon both the PBGC's claims
arising from insuring those obligations27 ' and the IRS's concomitant
underfunding penalty claim, leading to a larger bankruptcy estate
when compared with the adequate funding scenario. Only Congress
can eliminate this disincentive.
There are other general arguments against tax priority that require
broad and radical changes to the Bankruptcy Code's distributional
system. Some commentators believe that the government receives
eighth priority for its tax claims purely as a result of its power and not
on the basis of any principle that warrants excepting these claims from
being treated pari passu with general unsecured claims.2 In line with
this argument, one commentator advocates that the tax claims of
government should be denied priority because the amounts of these
claims are trifling in the scheme of the whole revenue collection
system and, if paid below one hundred percent, the government's
losses would be an insignificant sacrifice on the part of the federal
bureaucracy.27 3 In fact, many countries agree with this policy,
generally restricting priority treatment to a bare minimum of claim
269. See supra text accompanying note 68.
270. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 365 (granting the trustee or debtor-in-possession
power to assume or reject any executory contract).
271. See supra text accompanying note 101.
272. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy'making in an Imperfect World, 92
Mich. L. Rev. 336, 359-61 (1993) [hereinafter Warren, Imperfect World];j Jack F.
Williams, National Bankruptcy Review Commission Tar Recommendations:
Individual Debtors, Priorities, and Disdarge, 14 Bankr. Dev. J. 1. 51-52 (1997).
273. See Williams, supra note 272, at 51.
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categories or specifically abolishing priority treatment of government
claims.274  For example, Germany, inspired by an academically-
conceived policy, has eliminated priority treatment of many types of
claims, including government claims.2175 Australia has eliminated tax
priority, with England, New Zealand, and Canada following suit to a
lesser extent.276
Another consequence of tax priority is that it erodes the bankruptcy
estate, a phenomenon that fosters discontent among general
unsecured creditors within the bankruptcy system.277  The cost of
alienating creditors, such as trade suppliers, is that they may refuse to
continue trading with the reorganized company, significantly
diminishing the chance for the company to reorganize successfully.
The flip side to this point is that a greater distribution to general
unsecured creditors will make them happier. Thus, these creditors
may facilitate a successful reorganization by readily engaging in
transactions with the reorganized debtor because a positive
bankruptcy experience has caused them to perceive less risk in such
activity.
The foregoing demonstrates the poor policy choice inherent in
priority treatment of claims for overfunding assessments. The next
section delves into the likelihood of the courts properly accounting for
bankruptcy policy and correctly interpreting § 4980.
B. Can the Courts Solve this Problem?
One entity that can promote bankruptcy policies in the treatment of
§ 4980 claims is the judicial branch of government, as represented by
the federal courts. In this instance, a judicial solution may be more
feasible than a legislative one. A court can act to solve the narrow
problem posed by § 4980 more quickly and cheaply than Congress can
because the time and expense required to obtain a remedy in the
courts may be less than that required to lobby Congress. The courts
can effect a change in the treatment of claims for overfunding
assessments to reflect the changes Congress made to the language and
structure of § 4980 since the Eighth Circuit decided Juvenile Shoe.
Indeed, courts may apply the Fabricators functional test differently
because the new overfunding provision provides a departure from the
normal twenty percent rate to a fifty percent rate should plan sponsors
fail to divert residual assets to a replacement plan. Courts may view
the fifty percent rate as a sanction against employers that do not share
their residual assets with their employees and find that the
274. See Barbara K. Morgan, Should the Sovereign Be Paid First? A Comparative
International Analysis of the Priority for Tax Claims in Banknptcy, 74 Am. Bankr.
L.J. 461,465-70 (2000).
275. Id. at 491-93.
276. Id. at 500-01.
277. See Williams, supra note 272, at 51-52.
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overfunding provision is punitive in operation. However, whether
courts will take this approach is uncertain and unpredictable. Courts,
especially those in the Eighth Circuit, may feel constrained, despite
the revision of § 4980, to follow Juvenile Shoe, which specifically
found the overfunding provision to be an excise tax. Further, opinions
may vary within and among circuits, requiring the Supreme Court to
again intervene as it did in Fabricators. Such a conflict may take years
to develop-and even more time before the Court finally resolves it.
Further, it is undesirable and unfeasible for the high court to resolve
every application of the Fabricators test, though the development of
conflicting interpretations would demonstrate the inherent
unworkability of the test.
The next section suggests an array of legislative solutions to the
current problem with claims for overfunding assessments. It
advocates for the narrow option of amending § 4980 as the best means
of advancing bankruptcy policy.
C. Can Congress Provide a Legislative Solution?
A viable solution for remediating the disincentives raised by the
overfunding assessment provision is a legislative amendment. There
are a number of ways to promote bankruptcy policy through
legislation. One possibility would be for Congress to follow members
of the international community and amend the Bankruptcy Code to
eliminate priority unsecured claims altogether or surgically remove
some or all tax claims from priority treatment. Second, Congress
could also amend Bankruptcy Code § 507(a)(8)(E), adding an
inclusive list of tax claims that courts should consider as excise taxes.
In a third alternative, Congress could supply a standard for courts to
apply, or a definition for courts to interpret, in order to determine
whether a given exaction is an excise tax or penalty.
However, the foregoing legislative options are unlikely. First,
abolishing the priority scheme would be an overbroad, not to mention
radical, step. It would be a very difficult congressional feat to
dismantle certain priority categories that represent concessions to
special interest groups.278 Specifically abolishing tax priority may be
just as difficult because it would require Congress to expressly disable
the government from collecting certain revenues in bankruptcy.
Second, incorporating an express list of taxes that fall under §
507(a)(8)(E) may be a worthy idea, as it would be a bright line
solution that would lay to rest any future tax-penalty questions.
However, congressional crafting of such a list may not reflect the
advancement of bankruptcy policy. If Congress's experience with
other priority categories is any example, a putative list of excise taxes
may be composed of those that advance special interests irrespective
278. See Warren, Imperfect World, supra note 272, at 359-61.
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of the substantive policy considerations. 9  Third, amending §
507(a)(8)(E) to incorporate congressional insight into a test or a
definition for solving excise tax-penalty questions would be an
overbroad measure, and, in any case, would only be valuable to the
extent Congress's test or definition was workable. For example,
incorporating the Fabricators test into § 507(a)(8)(E) would
accomplish nothing at great expense. Any alternative that would lead
to conflicting judicial outcomes would not guarantee the advancement
of bankruptcy policy in the administration of § 4980 claims.
The best alternative is for Congress to amend IRC § 4980(d)(6) to
exempt its operation against entities in bankruptcy proceedings. The
provision in subsection (d)(6) currently exempts entities liquidating
under Chapter 7 from the fifty percent exaction rate if they do not
transfer the residual assets into a replacement plan.280 This measure is
more a function of logic than any recognition of bankruptcy policy
because a liquidating business, which ceases to exist after the
bankruptcy proceeding, generally would have no reason to establish a
replacement plan. In any case, there is no exemption built into §
4980(d) applicable to reorganizing debtors. The following is a simple
proposed revision of subsection (d)(6), intended to replace the limited
exemption for plan sponsors involved with a liquidation proceeding
with a broader exemption:
(6) Exempted entities. This provision shall not apply to any entity
filing a liquidation or reorganization proceeding under applicable
federal or state law.
The proposed revision would exempt eligible parties from both the
twenty percent and fifty percent rates assessed under the provision.2'
This legislative solution is more preferable than the others because
it is parsimonious in design. It does not affect the treatment of any
other priority claims or tax claims. Therefore, this solution can be
achieved more easily than a wholesale revision of the Bankruptcy
Code. More importantly, such an amendment would advance the
relevant bankruptcy policies while allowing tax policy to prevail in
standard terminations outside of bankruptcy. It is important to note
that the debtor would not be shirking its tax obligation in toto; it still
279. Priority treatment of special interest parties, like grain producers or
fishermen, see 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(5), does not advance any substantive bankruptcy
policy. See Warren, Imperfect World, supra note 272, at 359-61. In bankruptcy, where
funds are scarce and efficiency is paramount, unjustifiably favoring such interests
leads to a less efficient and less fair distribution to creditors further down the payment
chain.
280. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980(d)(6) (1994).
281. In the alternative, should Congress be unwilling to abolish overfunding
assessments against debtors, it could amend § 4980 to explicitly accord such claims
unsecured status in bankruptcy. While the bankruptcy estate may not be maximized
as much as it would be under the exemption solution, distribution to general
unsecured creditors would still increase compared with the current state of the law.
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must pay ordinary income tax on the reversion. This solution is
cognizant of the bankruptcy context, in which a sponsor is terminating
its overfunded plan for the benefit of its creditors, and not for its own
gain. Furthermore, it eliminates the moral hazard that may tempt a
sponsor to underfund its plan before filing in order to expand the
bankruptcy estate. Moreover, this solution still preserves the estate
for general unsecured creditors and relieves the PBGC from having to
pay the benefits owed by an underfunded plan.
CONCLUSION
Congress should amend IRC § 4980 to exempt it from operating
against residual plan assets reverting to a company seeking
bankruptcy protection. To date, the case law has not seriously
considered the interplay of the various federal policies when a debtor
incurs a § 4980 exaction before or during bankruptcy. Amending §
4980 would advance the bankruptcy policies of maximizing the
distribution to general unsecured creditors and protecting innocent
creditors from paying for the debtor's malfeasance. The scope of this
solution is narrowly tailored to the problem it addresses and does no
violence to the tax policy that seeks to recover the residual assets of
terminated plans that benefited from tax-free growth. Expanding the
distribution available to unsecured creditors will result in greater
satisfaction among such creditors with the bankruptcy system.
Consequently, they may perceive less risk in dealing with the
reorganized debtor, thereby increasing the chances of a successful
reorganization. In addition, amending § 4980 would diminish the
debtor's incentive to undertake the pre-petition moral hazard in which
it may choose to underfund pension plans in order to expand the
putative bankruptcy estate.
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